notes and comments

One of my continuous suspicions about the Republic is that piety is a hidden virtue, which isn’t explicitly discussed (unlike in Protagoras) but remains an important, influential and unspoken presence. This is, however, still a suspicion and I havn’t been able to mount a convincing case as of yet. And yet, here, from a bit of bk. I, I find some corroberating evidence.

Bk. I begins with several asides to pious behavior and piety (since I couldn’t tell you what piety is, especially for Plato, I’m assuming that I may associate piety with religion, the gods, reverence toward the divine, etc.). Socrates and Glaucon go to pray and take in the festival (why are spectacles and prayer associated?) and then, upon arrival at the house of Cephalus and Polemarchus, Cephalus is said to be wearing a wreath because he has just preformed sacrfices, and then, when he leaves, he goes to attend to the sacrifices again (328c, 331d).

Now, Cephalus leaving seems to be good for the dialogue. It gets the young men engaged and an actual discussion of justice off the ground. Presumably, this couldn’t have happened with Cephalus around (I think this is true for no other reason than that he quickly leaves when Socrates no longer allows him to simply opine, but begins cross-examining him), and we get the rest of the Republic, in away, because Cephalus leaves, and hands over the argument to his son.

But what are we to make of the fact that the most explicit references to organized religion occur in this very short section? Little or no explicit reference is made to sacrifices and religious festivals through out the rest of the dialogue. The next extended discussion takes place in bk. III, in which the city is purged of those poets who might say incorrect things about the gods, heros or the afterlife. Now this can be considered a kind of pious discussion. However, it is unclear if what motivates the discussion is a concern for piety or a concern for the education of the guardians. The explicit reason is the education of the guardians, at least where the discussion begins in bk. II (377b), and we have no clear reason yet to deny that this is the only reason.

The next reference to explicitly organized religion is in bk. IV, where the city is finally to be founded, at Socrates says the last laws that must be passed cannot be passed by the interlocutors, but by Apollo at Delphi: [Adiemantus] “Then what,” he said, “might still remain for our legislation?” And I said “For us, nothing. However for the Apollo at Delphi there remain the greatest, fairest, and first of the laws which are given.” These laws deal explicitly with “Foundings of temples, sacrifices, and whatever else belongs to the care of gods, demons, and heroes; and furhter, burial of the dead and all the services needed to keep those in that other place gracious.” (427b). Socrates says that the god is the “ancestral interpreter” and the only one who can act as such. Hereafter, we find little (until bk. X) of such discussion of religion and these laws.

What does this mean for Cephalus and bk. I? A few simple things about Cephalus: he is an uncritical acceptor of ancestral knowledge (note that he leaves when Socrates denies the truth of the ancient definition of justice), is an old, established, wealthy Metic. In other words, he is not a proper Athenian, and so could not be the “ancestral interpreter” of the culture of antiquity which Socrates mentions above.

What are we to draw from this? Here is my suspicion, which will require further support. Cephalus, in his rejection, and possible ejection from the community of discourse set up in his house (on the subject of whether or not he leaves the discussion voluntarily, or because of the pressure applied to him by Socrates, see Alan Bloom’s commentary on the text) is a foreign sacrafice, a sacrifice of the other, which is required for the discussion to occur.

Why would someone adopt this position? Cephalus is a defender of the tradition of antiquity, but this is purged from the city, as he is purged from the discussion. Could Polemarchus, also a defender of antiquity, be in the same position? No, because Polemarchus stays in the discussion, he becomes a member of the community, whereas Cephalus leaves with his position undefended; he is not a defender, he is an abdicator. Secondly, Polemarchus’ decision to stay in the discussion means he can be moved, his youth implies pliability, which Cephalus does not possess. Polemarchus, while a defender of antiquity to a degree, does not therefore occupy the same position as Cephalus.

If, as Bloom, Strauss, and others assert, the Republic is Plato’s true apalogy for Socrates, then the parrallels between Cephalus and Socrates are illuminating and helpful to my case. Cephalus and Socrates are both men the two senior men in bk. 1. They are older than the rest of the party, although apparently Cephalus is rather older then Socrates. Socrates is a man of standing in the intellectual community, whereas Cephalus is in possession of great wealth. Socrates is an Athenian, in contrast to Cephalus, but apparently Cephalus’s wealth and standing are such that Cephalus can presume to ask Socrates to come down and see him, as opposed to the other way around. The picture emerges quickly. If Socrates was killed because he was a danger to the state for intellectual (or, perhaps better said, spiritual reasons), it is not difficult to see Cephalus as the picture of the real problem. That is, the wealthy foreigner, part of the culture which lures young Athenian men away from Athens, and where foreign gods are introduced and an a perpetuator of the uncritical reception of the ideas of antiquity. It is Cephalus who must be sacrificed for the city’s good, Cephalus and all he represents.

But what, in all of this, is pious? First of all Cephalus, antiquity personified, goes to attend to the sacrifices and never returns. Thereafter, these ideas, the foundations of his sacrifice are purged from the city, as noted above. Furthermore, let us consider the idea of sacrifice in greek literature, particularly in Homeric literature. Commonly represented as being the first fruits, or at leas a choice part of the feast is offered to the gods as libations (note that Socrates refers to the discussion as being a “feast” at the end of bk. 1) and there is the case of the human sacrifice at the begginning of the trojan war by Aggamemnon (Aeschylus, the Orestes). The Republic begins with a journey, especially relevent is the use of the verb katabein (sp?) for heading homeward, which is the same word used to describe Odysseus’ action in the Odyssey. Therfore, book 1 is ripe with settings for a sacrifice, and of course, the explicit mention of it in connection with Cephalus.

But must there be a sacrifice? This is not so clear, and will require more argument. However, it does seem clear that Cephalus leaving is a good thing, the rejection of what he represents is represented as a pious act since it corrects the perception of the gods, and he is the only one who explicitly leaves.